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 On 27 July 1996 Indonesian politics was shaken by the most widespread riots to occur 
in the capital city for over twenty years.  The leader of the opposition Indonesian Democratic 
Party (PDI), Megawati Sukarnoputri, had recently been overthrown from within her party in a 
government-engineered move.  When she refused to bow to pressure and her supporters 
continued to occupy the PDI headquarters in central Jakarta, her opponents mounted a violent 
assault, and were actively aided by local sections of the Armed Forces.  The forced removal 
of a popular opposition figure by state-backed armed thugs, leading to perhaps dozens of 
deaths, caused outrage to spill onto the streets.  Crowds of youth and other protestors blocked 
roads, burned buildings, hurled stones at anyone in uniform, and for the following day played 
cat-and-mouse with the security forces sent to quell unrest.i   
 
 In the wake of the riots security forces rounded up and detained scores of political 
activists, and subjected Megawati’s diverse band of supporters to sustained intimidation.  
Considerable press and scholarly attention has been given to these events and to the 
subsequent crackdown.  Some have described this as a turning point in state-society relations, 
marking the end of a period of political ‘openness’ that had officially begun in 1989.  It 
certainly provides evidence of a worrying degree of social alienation and high levels of 
political frustration, leading many proponents of democracy to despair of meaningful political 
change under the current leadership.  Assuming that President Soeharto will be duly 
reelected, unopposed, during the five-yearly deliberations of the People’s House of Assembly 
(MPR) in March 1998, most commentators have focused on the choice of a successor -- 
particularly the Vice-President who would replace him should he suddenly retire, be 
incapacitated or be forced from office.ii   Although the selection of a candidate more open to 
the democratic imperative may lead to political reform, the issue of democracy goes far 
beyond the personality of Soeharto’s successor, involving basic questions about political 
processes in Indonesia and the influences which shape them.  In this article I wish to explore 
the implications of these events for the theorisation of Indonesian politics, making two 
propositions.   
 
 First, I suggest that we are inclined to underestimate the extent to which state power 
may be employed by the ruling group to quash dissent.  In the article published in this journal 
in 1993, I predicted that liberalising tendencies would continue and that the government 
would treat political opponents with more tolerance; the advent of ‘openness’ indicated “an 
important shift in standard political discourse in Indonesia, perhaps heralding the emergence 
of a more liberal political culture”.iii  In retrospect, this picture was over-optimistic, for what 
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we have witnessed since has been an erosion of the small gains that had been made.  Rather 
than a growing diversity of elite opinion and continued liberalisation, political power remains 
concentrated around a president now more willing to use state authority arbitrarily.  And 
rather than representing a sudden end to a timid experiment with liberalism, the 27 July 
incident and its aftermath should be seen as part of a longer-term tightening of political 
restrictions that has taken place since the early 1990s.  Oppositional political groups remain 
very active, and are sometimes able to exploit tensions within the ruling elite, building links 
with parts of the state apparatus.  But as illustrated below, opposition groups have been 
further excluded from institutionalised politics.  
 
 Second, I suggest that the non-responsiveness of political institutions in the context of 
popular dissatisfaction indicates a need for a broader mode of analysis.  The preoccupation of 
scholars of Indonesian politics with either state institutions or class analysis has meant that 
those seeking to identify democratising forces underestimate the extent to which culture itself 
may shape political outcomes.  In 1993 I argued that the expansion of the middle classes was 
the chief barrier to the broad democratisation of state institutions.   
Should advocates of a more liberal political system succeed, it is plausible that this 
would open the way for new social forces to enter the institutions of state.  But the 
interests of the expanding middle classes are increasingly tied to the emerging 
structures of Indonesian capitalism, and they are likely to oppose serious challenges to 
the status quo.  What we are likely to see, therefore, is only a partial liberalisation, one 
that reinforces the economic interests and increases the political influence of 
Indonesia's urban middle classes.iv  
Clearly, Indonesia’s political rulers have been able to short-circuit the tentative liberalisation 
of the late 1980s and early 1990s.  It is equally evident that the middle classes have not risen 
up in anger to prevent this from occurring.  But below the surface of a state-dominated 
political system there is considerable disenchantment with official politics, an almost tangible 
desire for a new form of politics that may be laying the ideological basis for a more 
democratic form of governance.  This dissatisfaction and its political manifestation can be 
understood best, I submit, through the lens of a political culture approach.  
The Muffling of Overt Opposition in the 1990s  
 The calls for democratisation in Indonesia began to mount in the mid-1980s, when 
important sectors of the political elite began to advocate the open debate of sensitive issues.  
For various tactical reasons, a number of political groups called for changes in the existing 
political order under the slogan of political ‘openness’: members of parliament regretted the 
constraints on political parties; government leaders urged greater civilian political 
participation; even senior Armed Forces (ABRI) officers called for open debate in a more 
tolerant political climate.  In mid-1990 Soeharto was obliged to acknowledge that open 
debate may be necessary to ensure future economic development.v   
 
 This liberalisation of debate coincided with an upsurge in public protest from non-
elite sources, suggesting that the government’s acceptance of diverse political opinion was 
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also a tacit acknowledgement that it could not remove all dissent.  Such protests have 
persisted.  The acquisition of land designated for the development of private or state projects 
often results in demonstrations before parliament by poor squatters evicted from their shacks.  
Wild-cat strikes in the expanding manufacturing sector continue, as unrecognised and even 
illegal labour unions organise workers behind demands for improved working conditions.vi  In 
sum, there is now more open criticism of decisions made by various levels of the government 
than has occurred since perhaps the mid-1970s.   
   
 Yet despite the government’s frequent use of the rhetoric of democracy -- and its 
careful preservation of ostensibly democratic institutions -- such criticism has not been 
translated into tolerance of political opposition, as the attack on the PDI and its diverse 
supporters indicates.  Tight restrictions have been placed on opposition forces, and, if the 
term ‘openness’ is used at all within the apparatus, it tends to be a slogan used by state 
officials to legitimise decisions already made rather than to encourage public participation 
and open debate.  The expression of opposition opinion has thus been tightly corralled as part 
of the regime’s strategy to defuse dissent and prevent the formation of organic links between 
popular protest and the political centre.  
 
 It has been suggested that the New Order government has totalitarian ambitions, and 
seeks to encompass all social activities within the embrace of state authority.vii  Yet these 
aspirations have never been fully realised, partly because Indonesia’s oft-noted cultural and 
social diversity has mitigated against state control.  A rather creaky state apparatus has also 
lessened the effectiveness of state intervention.  The government has instead reinforced its 
authority using a corporatist strategy to control the articulation of political interests, 
attempting, on the one hand, to draw autonomous political forces into state-controlled 
organisations, while isolating potentially disruptive groups from the political process 
altogether.viii  The various crackdowns on dissent since 1993 should therefore be seen as 
examples of the second element in the regime’s corporatist strategy of cooption/isolation, of 
marking out the limits of legitimate debate to thereby prevent the institutionalisation of public 
protest.   
 
 Two cases will demonstrate the methods used to contain overt political opposition.  In 
the first instance, in June 1994 the publication permits of three widely read weekly news 
publications were suddenly revoked.  The ban placed on Tempo, Editor and Detik was the 
first large-scale action taken against the press since 1978, when over a dozen newspapers 
were banned following reports on anti-government demonstrations at national universities.  
Most observers were caught by surprise, for many had expected that, after almost three 
decades in power, the Soeharto government had become more tolerant of press criticism.  
Most readers had come to think of such journals, Tempo in particular, as an essential part of 
modern Indonesian society.  The bans were followed by a number of demonstrations and 
howls of protest from certain media circles, but these actions failed to force a backdown.ix   
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 The bannings certainly illustrate the regime’s capacity to set the boundaries of 
legitimate debate.  It was evidently journal’s exposure of divisions within the government 
over development policy that drew Soeharto’s anger, and was the immediate catalyst for the 
crackdown.x  The case also shows the extent to which the regime will go to maintain its 
image of unity.   
 
 The second case involves the repercussions of the attack on the PDI.  Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, daughter of the nation’s first president, Sukarno, had in the previous few years 
considerably broadened the appeal of the PDI.  By promoting earnest discussions on 
Indonesia’s political future and holding open forums to encourage public debate, Megawati 
had begun to transform the PDI from the tame government-sponsored organisation it had 
been since its creation in 1973 into an arena for the expression of open political opposition.  
The success of the PDI in areas of Central and East Java during the 1992 election campaign 
was followed by Megawati’s success in 1993 in winning party leadership, despite intense 
government pressure.  Her success gave birth to a new term in the lexicon of Indonesian 
politics, arus bawah (‘undercurrent’ or ‘grassroots’), which is now used to describe the 
mobilisation of mass support to oppose the leaders appointed by the ruling group, a 
phenomenon which stands in stark contrast to the political forms of the recent past.xi     
 In a case closely related to the attack on the PDI, in mid-1997 a 27-year old pro-
democracy activist, Budiman Sujatmiko, was convicted of fomenting subversion and was 
sentenced to thirteen years in jail; a dozen of his colleagues received similarly harsh 
sentences.  The background to this development was the tightening of political restraints, for 
it was the effective marginalisation of Megawati’s PDI from political life which led Budiman 
and his student colleagues to establish the ‘People’s Democracy Party’ (PRD) as a channel 
for political opposition.  The PRD now has been forced underground, but is still actively 
forging links with worker organisations.  For the analysis presented here, the significance of 
the state response to the PDI’s success and the formation of PRD is that it has cut the links 
between political protest and formal political representation.   
 
 It has also led to a resurgence of the anti-communist rhetoric that characterised the 
early years of the New Order.  By more closely prescribing the limits to legitimate political 
debate, the Soeharto government has also restricted the expression of opposition within 
formal political institutions.  A disturbing gap now exists between an official political culture, 
characterised by an emphasis on stability in order to promote economic development, and a 
deepening sense of popular distaste for an ageing regime.  In such a situation, one in which a 
chasm yawns between state institutions and popular sentiment, realignments can come 
swiftly.  
 
The Democratisation of Authoritarian Regimes  
 Perhaps the definitive element of democracy in modern states is the general 
acceptance of open political contestation as legitimate; democratisation thus entails the 
transition from a system in which opposition to the ruling group is considered treasonable, 
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heretical or a threat to the unity of the nation, to one in which it is an everyday political event.  
In the period following the collapse of the authoritarian regimes of eastern Europe in the late 
1980s, many other states have also successfully transformed their polities into democracies.  
In Latin America, there were few liberal democracies in the 1970s but, by the 1990s, most 
countries have functioning representative democracies.  Liberal democracy has also taken 
hold in a number of military-ruled states in tropical Africa, while in the space of only a few 
years South Africa has undergone one of the most remarkable democratic transitions of the 
twentieth century.  In Asia, countries as diverse as Nepal, Bangladesh, Taiwan, South Korea, 
Thailand and the Philippines have apparently and more or less successfully transformed 
authoritarian into democratic regimes, as initial hesitant experiments with liberal democracy 
have consolidated.  Liberal democracy has thus become the common, almost archetypal, 
model for democratisation in a capitalist world system.xii   
  
 In this process, we can distinguish between an initial liberalisation and its subsequent 
consolidation.  Most commonly, it is fragmentation of the ruling elite that encourages a 
liberalisation of debate that leads to the entry of new social forces into politics.  Unable to 
control the situation as it had previously, the ruling elite is driven to form alliances with non-
state forces, gradually allowing a wider range of societal forces to become involved in 
political processes.  Initially required to take into account the interests of different classes, the 
state eventually instititutionalises those interests within the political system.  The 
consolidation of democracy thus entails the political participation of social forces which 
possess a strong interest in its survival.xiii    
 
 Within our region, such a model is applicable to the recent experience of Thailand.  In 
the context of general dissatisfaction with the Suchinda regime and of widespread protest in 
1992, the ruling military elite split.  Different elements of the elite became allied with middle 
class and business forces anxious to restore political stability.  The regime was forced to 
negotiate with the political representatives of these social groups, gradually opening the way 
for a return to the liberal democracy of the mid-1970s.xiv  
 
 Amongst students of Indonesian politics, the discourse on democratisation has 
revolved around the identification of potentially democratising social forces.  Many look to 
the middle classes.  Dan Lev has identified liberal sectors of the professional classes as the 
agent for democratisation.  “A growing middle class is also likely to expand the number of 
reformers, especially among professionals, who will continue to raise questions about deeper 
change".xv   Soetjipto Wirosardjono also predicts that the growth of the middle classes will 
limit state autonomy, and may provide the basis for the eventual triumph of civil society.xvi  
More recently, Ariel Heryanto has emphasised the emancipatory role that middle class 
reformers are likely to play.xvii  The common element to these accounts is the faith that middle 
class activists can play an instrumental role in subjugating state authority to social power.  
 
 Against this view, some have pointed out that the potential influence of the middle 
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classes is constrained by their weak structural position within Indonesian society.  Crouch 
suggests that the middle classes are still too small in number and too dependent on 
government patronage to challenge political structures.xviii   Richard Robison also argues that 
the lack of access to state institutions has also critically weakened the political influence of 
middle class elements.   
It is little wonder, therefore, that middle class reformers have made such limited 
political progress in the past forty years.  Internally divided, dependent upon the state 
and fearful of social and economic chaos they have been immobilised.  The general 
assumption that middle classes represent sources of social power and wealth 
independent of the state and are therefore concerned with limiting its power and 
imposing accountability has not generally applied in Indonesia.xix     
   
 Others have gone further, arguing that it is the working class that has both the 
economic autonomy and political cohesion to constrain state authority and thereby advance 
democratisation.  Vedi Hadiz, for example, finds evidence of a larger, more confident and 
more self-conscious working class movement that is beginning to force political reform.xx  
Mark Berger also makes the theoretical case that it has been working class movements that 
have generated democratic reforms, and suggests that the question of democracy in Indonesia 
therefore depends on the emerging urban proletariat rather than the middle classes.xxi   
 
 The debate over whether it will be the working or middle classes who will deliver 
democracy is somewhat misplaced, however.  In the first place, the privileging of a particular 
class is inappropriate in rapidly changing societies.  Capitalist development is indeed 
associated with an expansion in both the size and political influence of the proletariat.  
However,  in developing countries the working class is “far too weak to achieve by itself 
democratic rights for the subordinate classes... Alliances across class boundaries become 
critically important for the advance of democracy”.xxii  In Southeast Asia, the major political 
changes of recent decades have indeed been associated with such inter-class coalitions.  In 
the Philippines, urban and rural workers undoubtedly provided the muscle that strengthened 
the anti-Marcos movements of the 1970s and 1980s, but it was NGOs staffed by middle class 
activists that provided the tactics and the organisation which preceeded the sudden collapse 
of the regime in 1986.xxiii  In Thailand, workers provided the momentum that eventually 
forced the military regime to negotiate with the opposition in 1992, but here too middle class 
activists organised protests at a critical period.xxiv  In both these cases it was the coalition of 
class interests that gave democracy movements their power.    
 
 In Indonesia, similarly, it has been political organisation across class lines that has 
provided the most potent challenges to the legitimacy of the New Order regime, and which 
has invoked the sharpest response.  Long before the recent demonising of the PRD, other 
NGO groups involved in worker and peasant causes have come under close security 
surveillance.  It is also likely that the attack on the PDI followed its success in marshalling 
both worker and business support.xxv     
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 A more fundamental reason for seeking to go beyond a focus on the articulation of 
class interests in the struggle for state power is that such analyses often overlook the extent to 
which political culture can shape political behaviour.  
 
Oppositional Politics and Indonesian Political Culture 
 Political culture refers to the cultural values that influence political behaviour, and 
therefore the collective attitudes of a population toward the body politic in general.  
Originally popularised in the 1960s by American behavioural social scientist who sought to 
establish a link between the perceptions of individuals and a nation’s political institutions, the 
concept came under considerable attack in the following decades as political scientists 
questioned its explanatory value.  Many came to consider political culture an interesting but, 
ultimately, secondary aspect of political behaviour.  However, three decades after Almond 
and Verba published their original study, The Civic Culture, political culture is again 
attracting interest.  The apparent decline of many class-based movements, the resurgence of 
religious sentiment and the rise of nationalism worldwide has led political scientists to ask 
once more, to what extent do cultural factors determine political behaviour?xxvi     
 
 The rediscovered version of political culture that has appeared in the last decade 
contains a fuller notion of political behaviour and the influences upon it, but its applicability 
in the context of the democratisation debate presents us with a major methodological issue.  
Clearly, political culture is not directly determinative of political behaviour, which is 
generally explicable by more tangible factors.  But neither is it irrelevant, and some social 
scientists are prone to underestimate the resilience of cultural factors.  In the case of rule by 
an authoritarian regime, the challenge is to try to establish the extent to which social and 
ideological values are shifting, perhaps presenting the government with long-term legitimacy 
problems.   
 
 Political scientists have long used a rather static formulation of political culture to 
account for Indonesian political behaviour.  The New Order has often been characterised as 
statist, with decisions made autonomously by political leaders and implemented on behalf of 
a passive population.  In some accounts, ideology and beliefs are virtually manufactured by 
the political leadership.xxvii  However, Indonesia’s political culture is not monolithic, and 
opposition groups are able to manoeuvre within it to protect their interests.  They often seek 
the support of particular state officials, and are constantly ‘testing the water’ to determine the 
limits of state tolerance towards criticism.  They have had some successes, and the 
government has occasionally made significant concessions in the face of public opposition.  
In what Chua B.H. has called the ‘politics of embarrassment,’ opposition groups are 
sometimes able to employ official rhetoric to push their own demands.xxviii  In other words, 
opposition groups can occasionally create space within the framework of government’s 
corporatist strategy to operate with some degree of autonomy.xxix  
 
 More importantly, in a rapidly changing society alternative cultures are always 
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available to opposition groups.  William Liddle notes that for over half-a-century the middle 
classes in Indonesia have nurtured a distinct intellectual and artistic subculture, one never 
effectively integrated into the dominant national culture.  This culture tends to be secular in 
outlook, more open to Western ideas, and more politically democratic; it is “an unofficial 
culture pushing for greater freedom and changes in many areas of social and cultural life".xxx  
The significant point made by Liddle is that development-induced prosperity has eroded the 
social basis upon which the dominant culture is built.xxxi   
 
 A useful framework for describing the complex process of cultural and political 
change that Indonesia is undergoing is provided by the late Raymond Williams.  Williams 
defines the dominant elements in a culture as the prevailing set of beliefs which give meaning 
to a particular social order and its institutions.  In Indonesia, the dominant cultural elements 
are clearly related to developmentalism, namely the state-directed process of economic 
development.  But for Williams the 'hegemonic process' of cultural and political construction 
is never static, for each culture contains within it elements that possess a source of 
signification beyond the cultural mainstream.  He notes, for example, that there are always 
'residual elements' that stand at some distance from the dominant culture: those experiences 
and activities given meaning by reference to a past dominant culture.  Because of their 
independent source of signification, it is always possible for such concepts to constitute a 
counter-ideology, and the process of tradition-forming by state institutions has been most 
intense in the ideological incorporation of such residual elements.   
 
 In Indonesia, the most obvious residual cultural elements are those associated with her 
pre-colonial and nationalist past, and would include notions of village democracy, Javanese 
mysticism, as well as concepts associated with the nationalism of the pre-1965 period.  
Radical nationalist ideas associated with Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, for example, are 
always available for reappropriation by critics of the current political order, and can therefore 
be considered active residual elements.  Past criticism of New Order development strategies 
has largely been in such terms, criticising the government for failing to realise the goals of 
the 1945 revolution.xxxii  
 For the purposes of the argument presented here, the most relevant of Williams's 
categories is that of ‘emergent’ political cultures, the elements which bring about new 
meanings, values, practices and relationships in a society's cultural life.  Williams considers 
the process of cultural change to be dialectical, an uneven process of breaks with tradition 
and efforts to absorb new ideas.  The active forces in this process are what he calls 
'formations', a broad category which includes both political institutions and intellectual 
movements.xxxiii  The praxis of ideological transformation has, historically, been associated 
with the rise of new classes, and the distinguishing feature of the emergent is that it possesses 
a social basis for alternative and oppositional cultural forms.  Existing institutions will 
attempt to either incorporate or delegitimise such values, but the initiatives of rising social 
forces cannot be coopted as easily as can those of residual elements.  Real breaks can occur, 
perhaps leading to new forms of political and cultural discourse.     
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The process of emergence...is then a constantly repeated, an always renewable, move 
beyond a phase of practical incorporation; usually made much more difficult by the 
fact that much incorporation looks like recognition, acknowledgment, and thus a form 
of acceptance.xxxiv  
 
 The immediate relevance of Williams's perspective on ideological change is in 
accounting for the creeping acceptance in Indonesia of notions associated with political 
liberalism.  Theorists note that as capitalism develops larger sectors of the middle class 
become involved in social reproduction, working as educators, professionals, journalists, 
artists and writers.  This social change in turn introduces a new form of politics in which 
intellectuals play an enhanced role.xxxv   In Indonesia, this critical middle class has expanded 
rapidly in recent decades: growing sectors of the middle class are involved in media and 
communication industries; there has been a vast increase in the number of university 
graduates, particularly from private universities; hundreds of youth activists are still joining 
the NGO movement, evidently in increasing numbers; and perhaps most importantly, many 
of these graduates and middle class activists have found employment in journalism and other 
media-related activities, where they now possess the means to disseminate their views on a 







 While the ideological effect of the growth of this middle class sector is necessarily 
somewhat intangible, it seems to have further enhanced the 'vital and dynamic alternative' 
political culture identified by Liddle.  It seems clear from anecdotal evidence that the 
clampdown on press freedom has angered much of the largely middle class readership, and 
the closure of avenues of political expression has damaged the regime’s legitimacy.  
Indonesia now has a more heterogenous political opposition with a stronger institutional base 
in society, one that is urging a broadening of democratic processes. xxxvi  Conditions exist for 
the formation of cross-class alliances, while it is becoming increasingly difficult for a state-
dominated political culture to incorporate the resultant demands for political liberalisation.   
 
Conclusion 
 Below the somewhat staid surface of official politics, Indonesian society is thus in a 
state of flux.  The evident capacity of the government to prevent public protest has made 
opposition groups reluctant to challenge state authority openly; opposition circles recognise 
that the reform of state institutions might entail a lengthy process.  Yet a sense of frustration 
persists, and even from within state structures there have been calls for the reform of political 
structures to allow wider popular participationxxxvii  Indonesian society thus contains elements 
that can advance its emergent culture, the political form of which is liberal democracy.  
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